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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Unemployment remains one of South Africa’s most pressing problems. At the 
same time there is a great need for physical infrastructure in both urban and rural areas. 
In addition there is a lack of individual skills and institutional capacity. From a 
theoretical perspective, supported by large-scale experience elsewhere in Africa and 
research and development in South Africa, there are reasons for advocating that the 
establishment of formulated programmes using labour-intensive methods would result in 
the construction and maintenance of the required infrastructure, generate employment, 
develop individual skills and improve instimtional capacities. (The principles, process 
and results provide a datum by which to compare other programmes.) Based on this 
approach a National Public Works Programme (NPWP)* was launched in 1994. After 
providing some essential background, this article will briefly describe and discuss the 
progress of South Africa’s NPWP.
Its full title was the "National Employment Creation Programme Using Labour- 
intensive Methods for the Construction and Maintenance of Public Infrastructure". 
This became known as the NPWP.
2. BACKGROUND'
2.1 General
Unemployment
In South Africa the level of unemployment is extremely high. Depending upon 
the formal definition used official rates vary from 25 %* to 35%. For some sectors it is 
much higher: excluding those being educated, the rate for the 16-19 age group is 60- 
70%;^ in various settlements it is estimated at 70%. It is doubtful whether a democracy 
can withstand these levels of unemployment for very long.
o
Lack of Infrastructure, Individual Skills and Institutional Capacities
There is a great need for building (housing, education, health) and infrastructure 
both urban (water supply, sewerage reticulation and treatment, storm water drainage, 
streets, electrical supply and waste disposal) and rural (services for settlements; dams; 
irrigation canals; roads). These are set within a low level of individual and community 
capacity in both technical and institutional terms. An exemplification of the legacy of 
apartheid is that until very recently, of 10 000 ‘black’** school entrants only one would 
complete 12 years of schooling and be eligible to study either engineering or medicine. 
In 1972 there were 6 000 apprentices in the building industry, recently there have been 
about 500.
* The definition that results in 25% excludes from consideration those no longer 
actively seeking employment.
** The Constitution no longer has racial categories, however, this usage has been 
adopted by the Centre for Statistical Services (CSS) as short-hand to capture the 
fact that apartheid resulted in the majority of the poor and disadvantaged being 
‘black’.
From a theoretical perspective, supported by experience elsewhere in Africa, there 
are reasons for considering that properly formulated programmes using employment- 
intensivemethods of construction and maintenance can generate employment, provide 
good quality infrastructure and enhance individual skills and institutional capacities.
Large-scale Employment-Intensive Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa)
Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa large programmes using employment-intensive* 
methods for the provision of physical infrastructure have achieved several important and 
complementary development objectives:
• a significant increase in employment generation per unit of expenditure;
• the construction and maintenance of technically sound and economically efficient 
assets;
• the development of individual skills: technical, supervisory, managerial,
administrative and entrepreneurial; and
• the building of institutional capacity at local, regional and national levels.
How can this be demonstrated? Examine the results of documented programmes. 
A few sentences will suffice to show the scale and scope of achievement. Every day over 
10 000 people are employed in Kenya on the construction and maintenance of low-cost.
Employment-intensive =  labour-intensive =  labour-based. The switch to 
‘employment-intensive’ has taken place because the word ‘labour’ focuses 
attention upon the labourer and ignores the extent to which the success of this 
type of work depends upon appropriate policy, institution, organisation, training 
and management.
rural roads. Since 1974 over 12 000 kilometres of these roads have been constructed and 
maintained. For Botswana, since 1980, the figures are 3 000 people and 2 000 kilometres 
respectively. Comparable results have been achieved in Ghana, Lesotho and Malawi.
The theoretical foundations of labour-intensive construction were formulated in 
the early 1970s. Civil engineering construction provides an opportunity for the 
substitution of labour for equipment. Labour-intensive construction may be defined as 
the economically efficient employment of as much labour as is technically feasible to 
produce as high a standard of construction as demanded by the specification and allowed 
by the funding available. The result is a significant increase in employment 
opportunities per unit of expenditure (for example, from 10% to 30-65% of total 
construction costs [i.e. an increase of 200 to 550%); not an increase of 10 to 50% in the 
labour cost [i.e. resulting in labour costs rising only from 11% to 15% of total 
construction costs]). Labour-intensive methods also substitute local for imported energy. 
Essentially, labour-intensive construction has two main objectives:
(i) a technically sound (good quality), economically efficient product: equivalent to 
that achieved by conventional construction; and
(ii) a significant increase in the use of labour per unit of expenditure.
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Successful site implementation regarding technical feasibility and economic 
efficiency depended upon the following basic principles:
• The projects must be treated as proper engineering while giving serious 
consideration to social benefits besides the product itself.
• Type of work must be appropriate to employment-intensive methods.
• Detailed technical analysis must be carried out.
Design, specifications and documentation should be appropriate.
During pilot projects method and work studies should be carried out, iteratively, 
to reveal:
(i) the various operations and optimal sequencing of such operations;
(ii) the various activities within each operation;
(iii) the individual and group tasks appropriate to the different activities and 
operations;
(iv) the balancing of the work force required for activities and operations.* 
As far as possible the work must be based on individual or group tasks. In the 
case of individual tasks, it has been found that these can only be specified for 
about 60% of highly labour-intensive work.
Conditions of employment must be appropriate.
‘A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’ and ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s 
wage’; and a corollary: no work, no pay.
The labourers make their own way to work: transport to site is their
responsibility.
1 raining must be extensive and good at what it sets out w  do: particular attention 
must be paid to site supervisors (road builders) and multi-site supervisors (sites 
supervisors or managers).
The labourers must accept instructions given by trained road builders.
This type of analytical work is not peculiar to labour-intensive work. It forms part 
of standard procedure with regard to the use of equipment; for example, 
balancing the numbers of excavators, loaders and trucks required for cut and fill. 
However, it is curious how often ‘balancing’ is ignored in labour-intensive work. 
The labourers are then blamed for standing around doing nothing.
• There should be close liaison between site work and the local community; but 
liaison must not be the responsibility of the site supervisor.
• Sites must be well organised.
• Strong organisations are required with good management systems.
The last five do overlap with some of the factors influencing programme development.
They are retained here because of their importance for day-to-day site performance. 
Drawing upon experience and analysis of the programmes in Kenya and Botswana
in particular, it is considered that the following are the main reasons for success of large-
scale programmes:
(i) Programmes were long-term and national (not ad hoc projects).
(ii) There was a sound intellectual assessment of the technical feasibility and 
economic efficiency of using labour-intensive methods: cognisance was taken of 
technological and institutional capacities.
(iii) Technical, institutional, organisation and socio-economic aspects received 
concentrated attention during preliminary work, continued through pilot projects, 
embryonic training programmes, and subsequent national programmes. Technical 
matters included type of work appropriate to labour-intensive methods, detailed 
technical analysis, design, standards of construction, specifications, documentation, 
tender procedures, tools and equipment, and methods of construction. 
Institutional matters included the decentralisation necessary for grassroots success 
and the centralisation necessary to plan and co-ordinate a large programme. 
Organisational aspects included management structures, contractual arrangements, 
and systems (recording, reporting, controlling, monitoring and evaluation) and 
training. Socio-economic aspects included wage rates, conditions of employment.
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labour supply, role of women and social impact studies. Prior agreement was 
reached between the different parties with regard to wage rates, conditions of 
employment and the role and responsibilities of the community. As far as 
possible the work was based on individual and group tasks. ‘A fair days work for 
a fair days wage’ and vice versa. Close liaison between project, programme and 
local community.
(iv) Strong organisations were established with good management systems; a balance 
was achieved between decentralisation and centralisation.
(v) Training was extensive and good at what it set out to do; in particular road 
builders and multi-site supervisors.
(vi) There was long-term political support.
(vii) There was long-term financial commitment.
(viii) On balance there was good co-ordination between the government, government 
departments, those administering the programme, local authorities, those 
providing technical assistance and donors.
And the corollary: they were not short-term emergency relief projects.
2.2 Large-scale Projects and Programmes in Sonth Africa Prior to 1994
Review of the work elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Southern Africa had at least two 
implications for South Africa. The programmes in Kenya and Botswana have
demonstrated that good-quality, low-volume rural roads may be constructed and 
maintained by highly labour-intensive means: five to seven times more employment
being generated per unit of expenditure. The increase was achieved by the identification 
of the type of work which could incorporate a significant increase of labour per cent of
expenditure and then through extensive investigation of economically efficient 
implementation. Secondly, the potential had been proven in large-scale operations over 
a fifteen to twenty year period.
However, by contrast to other sub-Saharan experience, the results of large-scale 
work in South Africa has been unimpressive. From 1980 to 1994 billions of rands* were 
spent on projects and so-called programmes with stated objectives of both creating 
employment and providing physical infrastructure such as roads, water supply and 
sanitation. To these objectives community participation and entrepreneurial
development have often been added. Analysis of this experience’ revealed several 
disturbing characteristics:
• Very little sustainable employment was created.
• The assets constructed were not cost-effective, of doubtful value and ill- 
maintained (the results have often disappeared).
• Little national, provincial and local institutional capacity building took place. 
Internal planning, data collection, monitoring and control were severely lacking. 
Independent evaluation was noticeable in its absence. Given the lack of systems 
planning and monitoring, systematic evaluation would have been extremely 
difficult anyway.
• The expenditure on development failed to reach the target group to the extent 
envisaged.
During a period when the Rand varied from Rl,5-R2,5 to the US Dollar.
Individual skills were not improved. Training, where present, was not particularly 
appropriate or focused and has not shown itself to be carried through into post­
project employment.
The majority of the so-called labour-intensive work had been either conventional 
or labour-eartensive: conventional construction does not produce additional employment 
per unit of expenditure; labour extensive work is the temporary employment of large 
numbers of people to produce products of doubtful value without much concern for time 
and cost (these projects re-enforce the prejudice of those who cannot conceive of 
effective employment-intensive work).
In 1994, the Urban Foundation published in its Research Report 8 a study carried 
out by the Economic Research Unit of the University of Natal: Public Works
Programmes in South Africa: A Key Element in Employment Policy? In relation to 
availability and quality of data it stated:
Although it was a relatively straightforward task to identify so-called labour- 
based public works projects currently being implemented in South Africa, it 
was exceptionally difficult to obtain data on these schemes.'*
This is unacceptable.
In sum, the vast majority o f expenditure on job creation has been unsystematic 
and certainly has not made effective use of labour-intensive methods (no institution, no 
programme, little planning and training).
2.3 Research and Development in Employment-intensive Methods in South Africa
Turning from large-scale projects and expenditure to research: the Research
Centre for Employment Creation in Construction (located within the Department of Civil 
Engineering at the University of the Witwatersrand) indicates that significant 
employment opportunities may be created through the use of labour-intensive methods 
in the earthworks component of civil construction in general and for surfaced roads in 
urban areas in particular. In 1991 a cursory analysis of one component of civil 
construction work undertaken within a part of the public sector indicated that the 
number of people effectively employed in civil construction could be doubled - materially 
this would amount to increased opportunities for not less than 100 000 people (in an 
industry currently employing 60 000 people). Below it will be shown that a more 
thorough analysis revealed the potential for a significant increase.
But the research has gone beyond theory and estimates. In 1991 Phillips 
investigated the viability of reintroducing waterbound macadam as a base-course 
material. He found that there was the possibility for a ten-fold increase in the 
proportion of labour diverted to the construction of the base-course. Depending upon 
the assumptions made there was a financial premium of 10 to 70 per cent. As part of 
his PhD he carried out more detailed research into the financial trade-offs between cost 
and employment; depending upon assumptions made, employment could be increased 
by a factor of 40 (4 000 per cent increase). Such a finding encouraged further research 
(both from a technical and a national economic perspective) and should be of interest 
to anyone who is deeply concerned about the levels of unemployment. Over the past ten 
years over 20 Masters and PhD’s have been awarded in this field and over 40 research 
reports, papers in refereed Journals and conference proceedings have been produced.*
During the period 1994 to 1998 the analytical and laboratory work related to high 
standard road construction has been tested in the field. In collaboration with the Roads 
Directorate of the Greater Johannesburg (then Transitional) Metropwlitan Council 
stretches of such road have been constructed using labour-intensive methods.*’ 
Collaborative research initiated by the South African Bitumen and Tar Association 
(SABITA) resulted in the publication of two manuals on labour-enhanced construction 
of bituminous surfacings.’ Guidelines for the appropriate contract procedures and 
documentation for labour-intensive construction, the training of road-builders, and large- 
scale employment creation programmes have been prepared for the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBSA).* During 1997 and 1998 labour-intensive methods were used 
for the construction of the base-course of 13 km of national route (the N l).’
Research continues to be carried out to determine the number of employment 
opportunities that could be created throughout the various sub-sectors of civil 
engineering. However, one may be fairly confident that in relation to the road network, 
potential for an increase in the employment of labour per unit of expenditure exists in 
the following categories:
(i) Rural roads: construction and maintenance of ail standards of road. (While 
the use of labour-intensive methods for low-volume, low-cost roads is no longer 
problematic, the establishment of large-scale programmes is another matter.)
(ii) Urban roads and storm water drainage; construction of sub-base, base-course 
and wearing course for all standards of road.
In the meantime during the early 90s several public authorities and development 
agencies attempted to increase the use of labour-intensive methods by putting the onus 
upon the contractor. The contract documentation contained exhortations to use these
methods ‘wherever feasible’.'” There was a singular lack of effect. Such conscience 
salving exercises not only failed to understand that the greater use of labour-intensive 
methods starts with the design but also that at present the contractor is bound into a 
socio-technical system based upon the use of equipment and this cannot be changed 
overnight. On the one hand the designs, specifications and documentation hardly existed; 
on the other, the industry did not have the organisational structures, planning, procedures 
and supervisors to handle highly labour-intensive construction works. (However, we will 
see below that the industry was influenced to move in that direction but from a national 
perspective not from that of one client-consultant/contractor engaged on a single 
contract.)
2.3 Interim Lessons for the Future of Employment Creation Programmes in South
Africa
There were several implications for South Africa of labour-intensive work 
throughout Africa (i.e. including South Africa): first for the technology and techniques, 
secondly for the widespread propagation of employment-intensive work.
Specifically: Rural roads may be constructed and maintained by highly labour- 
intensive means: 5 to 7 times (500 to 700 per cent) more employment being generated ^  
per unit of expenditure without sacrificing quality, cost or time. It is also possible to 
create a significant increase in employment opportunities per unit of expenditure across 
a wide range of civil construction: including most municipal/urban engineering services, 
and using contractors.
However, re-consideration of the national programmes of rural road construction 
and maintenance elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa and various large-scale projects and
programmes in South Africa indicates the equal importance of the process by which this 
success was achieved. A strategy is required to establish a national employment creation 
programme for the construction of public works; the process results not only in greater 
employment but also in the generation of individual skills and institutional capacities, 
The strategy includes the following:
• The adoption of a long-term national perspective in which a programme is 
developed.
• The identification of the type of work which could incorporate greater use of 
local resources, in particular unskilled labour, and potential clerks, supervisors, 
technicians and administrators. The analysis of the extent to which local 
resources could be used within the types of work identified above (detailed 
technical assessment).
• Detailed attention to the other factors enumerated in the above ‘Reasons for 
success’: institutional, organisational, socio-economic.
• The need for a ‘programme’ (not ‘project’) approach, which can be succinctly 
described in the following four phases:
Phase One Orientation: consensus of all parties concerning type of project, 
method of construction and conditions of employment;
Phase Two Preparatory Work: analysis and planning;
Phase Three Pilot/Initiai Training: pilot/demonstration project incorporating 
an embryonic training programme;
Phase Four Expanded Training/National Programme: expansion of pilot
project and training programme into a regional or national programme: 
expansion should only take place at the rate at which trained people (site.
multi-site and national levels) can be produced from a programme; the local 
institutions can productively absorb the trained personnel; and the national 
institution is able to absorb and manage the trained management personnel 
and maintain its overall role vis-a-vis policy, funding, planning, organisation, 
training, co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation.
The above strategy will ensure the requisite institution building at community, 
regional and national levels. Through these phases the institution will grow itself (human 
resources and systems). In order to achieve the above, considerable attention must be 
paid to the education of all concerned in the principles and process of employment­
intensive construction.
The potential for a significant increase in employment generation per unit of 
expenditure is not automatically released by the intention to use employment-intensive 
methods on large-scale operations. Large-scale operations require establishment through 
policy, institution, organisation, training and programme development. The above 
approach has to be located within an institutional framework: national, regional, local. 
"Lead-in" time is necessary. The World Bank has recommended that where no previous 
experience exists a start-up period of at least three years should be considered." 
During this lead-in period phases 1 and 2 are carried out within the strategic approach 
outlined.
Through the ‘programme’ approach (as opposed to ‘project’) the institution is 
established together with the human resources required to implement the work from site 
level through to national planning and co-ordination. This process means that overheads 
are high during Phases One to Three. However, once the preparatory work has been 
done and the institution established overheads revert to more normal ratios. In Kenya,
for example, the ratio of overheads to direct construction was 84:16 during the first three 
years (1974-76) but 16:84 over the whole period 1974-1985. Expenditure on training 
accounted for 1-2% of programme costs.
The four-phased approach, outlined above, is the result of many years of 
experience and analysis. This approach will mean that the considerable sums of money 
which have been allocated by government over the past ten years to so-called labour- 
intensive work will have a developmental impact as opposed to being emergency relief.
By 1992 it was concluded that further expansion of employment creation in public 
works was limited by the lack of a long-term perspective, national planning and 
institutional development. From 1992 to 1994 there were some positive developments 
in this direction.
2.5 Towards a National Public Works Programme
During 1992 a widely representative National Consultative Forum on Drought 
(later the National Rural Development Forum) was initiated. The Forum decided to set 
up four Task Forces, one of which was the Employment Task Force. In turn this task 
force explored short-term and long-term options. In relation to the long-term it made 
recommendations as to the pre-investment work that needed to be carried out for a 
National Employment Creation Programme using Labour-intensive methods for the 
Construction and Maintenance of Public Infrastructure (water supply, sewerage, roads, 
stormwater drainage, erosion control, irrigation, electricity supply and other physical 
infrastructure).'^ An intrinsic part of this proposal was the development of individual 
and instimtional capacity (community, local, regional and national): extensive training 
was envisaged. While the full benefits of such work would be revealed in a long-term
programme, the short term was not ignored. The pre-investment work for this 
programme was taken forward by the National Economic Forum (NEF). Under the 
auspices of its Technical Committee (NEFTC) a pre-investment study was carried out.’’ 
On the 19 June 1994 the results of the NEF study were accepted by the Cabinet of the 
Government of National Unity as the basis of the National Public Works Programme 
(NPWP), The NPWP would not be a ‘tack-on’ programme: it would cover all public
expenditure on infrastructure for which it is feasible to use labour-intensive techniques. 
In essence the NWP consists of a process of labour-intensification and increased training 
and capacity building in the provision of infrastructure. The NPWP became a key 
component of the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
A second initiative was championed by the National Committee for Labour- 
intensive Construction (NCLIC) and COSATU. Early in 1992 a member of the South 
African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC) realized that greater use 
of labour-intensive methods of construction could alleviate unemployment and bring 
more work into an industry that had been crippled by recession, cutback in government 
spending and civil war. Representatives of several civil engineering industry associations 
(SAFCEC, South African Institution of Civil Engineers, South African Association of 
Consulting Engineers, South African Road Federation) met and decided to convene a 
symposium on labour- intensive construction. The author was invited to take part in 
preparatory meetings and present a paper ‘Setting the Scene’, and advised that if the 
group were intending to take the subject seriously they should invite COSATU to take 
part in the symposium. This led to a series of meetings between NCLIC (which by this 
time included the Institute of Municipal Engineers in South Africa) and COSATU. In 
part this has led to the Executive Director of SAFCEC defining the industry as labour-
intensive. More importantly this led to the drafting of a Framework Agreement. The 
Framework Agreement consisted of over 40 items. While each is important, in the first 
item the industry committed itself:
1.1 To maximize the use of labour intensive systems of construction within 
public works programmes, with due regard to economics.
In turn COSATU agreed to the linking of payment to production in public works. Both 
of these commitments were made within the context of community involvement in the 
definition of what has to be constructed, where, and in the construction process itself 
(not just employment creation but also skills: i.e. as much emphasis upon process as 
product). Training is an intrinsic part of the Agreement. The Framework Agreement 
between NCLIC, COSATU and the South African National Civics Organization 
(SANCO) was signed on 22 June 1993. Shortly thereafter a National Coordinating 
Conunittee (NCC) was been formed, an Accreditation Board for Labour-intensive 
Construction (ABLIC) established, pilot projects initiated and a monitoring and 
evaluation process set in motion. The co-operation between the public sector, privately 
owned companies, the Trades Unions and civic organizations is interesting and unusual 
to say the least.
At the same time, prior to the 1994 election the ANC’s proposed Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) was the result of several years of careful 
deliberation and widespread participation. One of the main thrusts of the RDP was to 
link reconstruction and development through an ‘infrastructural programme’. The key 
area where special measures to create Jobs could link to building the economy and 
meeting basic needs would be in redressing apartheid-created infrastructural disparities.
It was stated that there ‘must be a co-ordinated national public works programme to
provide much needed infrastructure’. One of the qualifying statements reads‘co-ordinate 
with and link to other job creation and labour-intensive construction initiatives’.'^
Are these not fundamental components of the long-term programme advocated 
by the Employment Task Force? Is this not the same as the long-term programme? Yes 
and No. All aspects of the Framework Agreement would be either critical or useful for 
the long-term programme. But the industry is currently equipment-intensive. Despite 
its assertion ‘to maximize the use of labour-intensive systems of construction . . . ’it cannot 
restructure itself overnight. This is explicitly acknowledged in the first item of the 
Framework Agreement by reference to ‘...with due regard to economics’, supplemented 
by the examples provided by the industry to support this position which indicated that 
it had yet to appreciate the extent to which equipment could be replaced by labour.
However, it is considered that, for example, in road construction the Framework 
Agreement could lead to the proportion of cost going to labour increasing from 10% to 
15% in the short term. For example, in relation to the N1 motorway between 
Johannesburg and Pretoria there were two options: 6% or 15% to labour. At that time 
the 6% option was chosen. The fact that there was a 15% option shows that within 
existing civil engineering practice it would be possible to generate employment 
opportunities. This was during the 1970’s before the concept of labour-intensive 
construction had any weight in South Africa. The author considers the Framework 
Agreement could lead to such developments. While not to be sneered at, it pales by 
comparison to the proportion of total construction cost that could be achieved by labour- 
intensive methods (60%-70%).* Nevertheless the author considers the language of the
Framework Agreement is sound and as such this initiative would be an ally of the long­
term programme: together with other sensible and organized short-term work it would 
form part of the lead-in phase thus creating some employment and public works, and 
responding to social needs and political demands.
During 1995 the three initiatives were fused. The concepts embodied in the work 
of the Employment Task Force provided the intellectual framework for the NPWP. 
Originally formulated by industry and construction COSATU, the Framework 
Agreement’s term of validity expired in June 1994. The process for re-negotiating the 
Framework Agreement was expanded to include the now legitimate government.
3. NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME
3.1 NPWP: A description of its original objectives, key principles, strategic thrusts and 
proposed means of implementation
In August 1994'* the South African Government of National Unity launched a National 
Public Works Programme (NPWP)’'". It was based on the proposals generated through a 
widely participatory detailed study by the National Economic Forum during the first half of 
1994, which in turn had grown out of deliberations carried out by the Employment Task 
Force of the National Consultative Forum on Drought/National Rural Development Forum'^ 
and incorporated into the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Responsibility for 
the NPWP was located within the National Department of Public Works.
The full title was printed on all the official documentation National Employment 
Creation Programme Using Labour-intensive Methods for the Construction and 
Maintenance of Public Infrastructure; National Public Works Programme (NPWP).
The main objectives of the NPWP'* were to:
• Reduce unemployment through the creation of productive labour-absorbing Jobs and 
opportunities for local contractors, through labour-intensive approaches, avoiding the 
creation of dependence and indigence commonly association with anti-poverty welfare 
programmes
• Educate and train those on the programme as a means of economic empowerment
• Create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets (such as clinics, schools, creches and 
roads) which serve to meet the basic needs of poor communities and promote broader 
economic activity
• Build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs, strengthen the local 
government and other institutions and generate sustainable economic development.
Key principles of the NPWP
Thirteen key principles were defined to guide the implementation of the NPWP:'’ 
constitutional context; role of government; partnership; decentralization and delegation; 
targeted approach; community empowerment; labour-intensity; sustainability; labour 
standards and wages; training and capacity building; efficiency and accountability; promotion 
of affirmative action; limited life. Five of these were singled out for more detailed ^  
delineation: labour-intensity; community empowerment; education and training; sustainability 
and planning; and monitoring and evaluation. The section on labour-intensity read as 
follows;
Labour intensity
Labour-intensive construction means the use o f labour rather than machines, 
where technically and economically feasible. I f it is not technically or economically 
feasible to use labour for a certain activity, machines should be used.
The construction o f many types o f infrastructure has become highly mechanized 
in South Africa since the I950‘s. In other words, people have been replaced by 
machines. The skills that used to be involved in labour-intensive construction have now 
been largely lost. These skills need to be re-leamt if  we are going to use people again. 
The relearning o f these skills, and improvement o f them, requires training and capacity 
building.
Labour-intensive construction does not mean having a few more labourers on site 
while carrying on doing the work using machines. Instead it involves changing the 
design o f infrastructure so that labour is used instead o f machines wherever 
economically and technically feasible.
There are both good economic and social reasons for moving to labour-intensive 
construction. South Africa has abundant labour, mostly unskilled and unemployed. 
From an economic point o f view, this means labour-intensive methods could be as 
efficient as machines in many activities, particularly in the construction sector.
The creation o f large scale jobs for the unemployed will in turn enhance skill 
levels in the society. This will also contribute to economic growth and development.
In some cases, the necessary technical knowledge does not yet exist and needs to 
be built up through technical research and development. Similarly, in some cases the 
necessary training material does not yet exist, and needs to be developed.
Table I shows the potential in labour content in the various sectors.
The NPWP should only expand (i.e. labour-intensive construction o f infrastructure 
which is conventionally constructed machine-intensively should only expand) at the rate 
at which the required trained capacity to obtain good quality and cost-effective products 
becomes available.
Labour, rather than machines, can be used for many construction activities such 
as excavation, loading and spreading soil and gravel. It is not technically feasible to 
use labour for some construction activities, such as compaction o f gravel to high 
densities.
On projects, such as earth dams and gravel roads, it is possible to use labour- 
intensive techniques for most o f the construction activities, resulting in a very high 
labour content o f construction costs.
However, for other projects, such as highways, it is not technically feasible to use 
labour-intensive techniques for as many development construction aaivities, and the 
labour content o f the construction costs will not be as high.
Thus, labour-intensive techniques can be used for some construction activities both 
in large and complex projects and small and simple projects. The use o f labour rather 
than machines - for the appropriate construction activities - can be specified in contract 
documents.
TABLE 1: SPENDING ON TARGETED LABOUR AS PERCENTAGE OF 
SPENDING ON LABOUR, PLANT, AND MATERIALS
S E C T O R C U R R E N T
S P E N D I N G
P O S S I B L E
S P E N D I N G
Simple projects 60% -  80% 60% - 80%
Low cost housing 25% - 35% 30% - 40%
Social buildings 20% -  30% 25% - 35%
Water reticulation 5% - 15% 25% - 35%
Stormwater 5% - 15% 40% - 50%
Sanitation 5% - 15% 25% - 35%
Roads 5% - 15% 30% - 80%
Dams 10% -  20% 50% - 80%
Railways 5% - 15% 30% - 30%
Forestry 25% - 35% 35% - 45%
Electrification 10% - 15% 12% - 17%
Small-scale agriculture-related 
infrastructure
40% - 80% 40% - 80%
Two Strategic Thrusts Identified for the Implementation of the NPWP
The key function of the NPWP is to ensure that the infrastructural provision of the state 
is carried out in a way which also maximises productive employment, training and capacity 
building, and community empowerment.
There were two strategic thrusts:
A programme to re-orient public expenditure on infrastructure and transform the 
institutional capacity o f the functions o f national, provincial and local government to 
ensure longer scale job creation, skills development and capacity building in 
forthcoming years.
A community-based public works programme to ensure short-term funding to a variety 
of government and non-government organisations provided they meet the criteria
consistent with the objectives o f the NPWP. This would ensure short-term delivery, 
particularly in rural areas where there is a lack o f institutional capacity. This fund 
would focus in creating employment and alleviating poverty in the short-term, while the 
capacity is built to deliver jobs in a cost effective manner through normal expenditure 
on infrastructural projects.^
In essence they comprised:
1. A programme to re-orient public expenditure;
2. The CBPWP.
Community-based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) '^
The second strategic thrust was the CBPWP. Its objectives were:
(i) Short-term delivery: to assist the Government of National Unity in urgent provision 
of employment opportunities and infrastructure, particularly in the rural areas where 
there is a lack of institutional capacity and great need.
(ii) Target the most needy, especially rural women and youth.
(iii) Kick start the NPWP by building capacity at provincial and local levels.
(iv) Demonstrate to government departments and the private sector how sustainable 
infrastructure can be delivered with the aid of involvement of communities, without 
large-scale use of machinery and without sacrificing standards.
From the RDP fund a sum of R250 million was allocated to the CBPWP for community-
driven infrastructural projects which could be implemented within a low level of institutional
capacity (and individual skills).
Implementation
The CBPWP was implemented in two ways, namely by the Provincial Departments of 
the National Department of Public Works and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s), 
especially those with a proven capacity to distribute funds. In order to receive CBPWP funds 
projects were supposed to meet the following criteria:
• Labour-intensive methods must be used.
• There must be strong community participation in all aspects of the project, from 
conception to design, implementation and monitoring.
• Provision must be made for the maintenance and management of the asset once it is 
completed.
• Assets created must be needed by communities to improve their welfare.
• Training and capacity building must be provided to participants.
• The applicant must be able to demonstrate that it has the capacity to implement the 
project at the quality specified.
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In 1995/6 the Provincial Departments of the Public Works Department were allocated R150 
million and Non-Governmental Organisations RlOO million.
3.2 Interim Results and Discussion 
General
To date what have been the results of the NPWP? Because of the complexity of the 
NPWP there is no simple (single) answer to this question. The answers depend upon the 
vantage point and the emphasis laid upon each of the various objectives stated in the original 
document.
Given the origins of the programmes and the overriding importance of employment 
creation, it is reasonable to focus initially upon its first objective: reduce unemployment. 
Thereafter the effectiveness of its two strategic thrusts will be discussed.
Reduce unemployment
Proper evaluation requires criteria and data. No target was set in the original NPWP 
documentation. In 1991 a cursory analysis of public sector expenditure had indicated that 
at least 100 000 additional productive employment opportunities could be generated. In 1994 
this was refined. Partly based on Table 1, for each sub-sector of civil engineering and 
building, estimates were made of the increase, over five years, of the proportion of people 
employed per billion of expenditure.^^ For example current employment generation for the 
conventional construction of roads, sanitation and dams is about 14 000 per billion for both 
roads and dams and 21 000 for dams. Over a five year period employment-intensive 
methods would result in 70 000 for roads and dams and 40 000 for sanitation: these
represent increases of 500%, 333% and 285% respectively, without compromising time, cost 
or quality. In 1995 the Public Works Department estimated that employment could be 
generated by the programme. In 1996 this figure was reiterated, there would be an increase 
of 100 000 jobs through ‘accelerated labour-based infrastructure development and 
maintenance of public works in urban and rural areas’.^ ’
Turning from estimates of potential to results in the macro-economy. In 1995 the civil 
engineering industry employed 64 424 people at R6,02 billion turnover; in 1998 it 
employed 75 387 people at R9,18 billion turnover (at current prices; the 1998 figures are 
still p ro v is io n a l).T h ere  has, therefore, been no noticeable effect on the mainstream 
industry. The NPWP has certainly not yet generated work for an additional 100 000 people
within the formal civil engineering industry. During 1998, 80% of the funding for civil 
engineering came from the public sector.“  Policies are in place and the public purse is 
providing the money but to date the NPWP has not yet resulted in a significant increase in 
employment per unit of expenditure within the formal/conventional construction sector.
Capacity Development
This is a subject for a separate paper - the results of an official PWD study by Mr 
Croswell and myself have indicated what needs to be done in future with regard to 
identification, appraisal, design, documentation, training.“
Re-orientation of Public Expenditure
To what extent has re-orientation and transformation occurred and has it resulted in 
ensuring ‘larger-scale job creation, skills development and capacity building’? As yet there 
has been no impact upon employment generation. What of the others?
In Section 2 it was shown that between 1992 and 1994 a Framework Agreement had 
been developed through extensive collaboration between industry, organised labour and 
community (local government to be). After the elections government formally became part 
of the process; many of those previously from organised labour and the community now 
wore new hats - however there was a significant dispersal of many of the central players to 
other more nationally important roles, e g. Alec Erwin (Minister of Trade), Jay Naidoo 
(Minister responsible for the RDP). At the time the signs were propitious.
Small Contractor Development
Despite the existence of a document which had resulted from extensive consultation, 
for reasons yet to be unearthed, the Department of Public Works embarked upon a vigorous 
programme of changing contract documentation and tendering processes to increase 
opportunities for small contractors (or in the parlance of the day: ‘previously
disadvantaged’)7’ To the best of my knowledge, it was initiated without much consultation 
with the various stakeholders and is bolstered mainly by the belief that the superior efficacy 
of the free-market supplemented by the opinion that small contractors generate more 
employment than large ones - (watch this space - the demand for equipment subsidy will soon 
be here). Some briefing sessions were held after production of the first batch of 
documentation. For about two years it was termed Affirmative Procurement Policy, now it 
has become Targeted Procurement. Although the preambles and introductory material state 
that job creation and labour-based methods are part of the rationale, this quickly fades from 
sight.
What has been the result? As yet, no noticeable effect on overall employment 
generation and no published data upon the number of small contractors. There is a body 
which represents these small contractors (formerly NABCAT now CIC), their links with 
SAFCEC continue to get closer.
The NPWP’s Integrated Training Report (First - and last - draft 14/12/95)“  estimated 
that for the period 1997/8 to 2000/1 between 342 and 618 small contractors would be 
required to carry out the work which would be available. To date no information has been 
made available as to the number of independent small contractors now operating. No data 
by which to judge reality against projection (another example of ‘lack of data collecting 
culture'). Emphasis upon small contractors distracts from attention to the organisations
which are responsible for the vast majority of implementation. Further, little attention has 
been paid to international experience which indicates that 75% of small businesses fail 
(therefore the need for a programme of development). Finally, an analysis^’ of major 
expenditure during 1998 shows that 79 per cent of contract expenditure is for contracts above 
R3 million (which can only be carried out by the large contractors) while contracts for less 
than R3 million account for less than 21% of the total value.* The emphasis upon small 
contractors does not appear to have heard of Turin, Drewer, Wells or Groak.
Institutional and Organisational Aspects
The National Department of Public Works was given responsibility for the NPWP 
(later, also for the transformation of the construction industry). However, it was often stated 
that the NPWP did not belong in any one line function department (NPWP, 1995b:22). 
Rather, it affected all government departments responsible for public spending on 
construction. The key national, provincial and local departments who had a role in 
implementation included the following Departments: Public Works, Transport, Water
Affairs, Housing, Education and Training, Health, and Constitutional Development and 
Provincial Affairs (the latter was charged with the task of implementing the R800 million 
‘Municipal Infrastructure Programme’).
While the PWD was responsible it may be seen that there were a considerable number 
of role players involved. Several factors exacerbated the potential for confusion. Although 
termed th e ‘Public Works Department’, historically it had become the ‘State’s landlord’
* The same analysis revealed that 79% of the total contract expenditure was carried out 
by about 20% of the number of contracts; while 21% of the total contract expenditure 
was carried out by 80% of the number of contracts.
mainly responsible for the leasing, maintenance and construction of public buildings (not 
works/infrastructure). Responsibility for construction and maintenance of major physical 
infrastructure (works) generally lay with the ‘line’ Department of Transport and Water 
Affairs (and their regional, provincial, local equivalents). There was some resistance from 
other departments - with their own hierarchies and procedures - to implement projects in 
accordance with principles laid down by another department. Particularly one that had been 
concerned with property as opposed to construction. The institutional difficulties which beset 
the NPWP were compounded by restructuring at provincial levels. In the Northern Province, 
for example, four apartheid structures have been in the process of amalgamation since 1994. 
As the NPWP Task Team reported less interdepartmental work was being done at provincial 
level due to the enormous re-organization with which most provinces had (and have) to deal. 
And, until recently there were no legitimate local authorities and thus no local institutions 
for funding, planning and implementation.
3.3 NPWP Assessments
Some comments have been made above under ‘General’.
A few pertinent quotes from Government’s '98 Report to the Nation^ succinctly 
summarise the Department of Public Works own assessment of the NPWP.
Transformation
Public Works has transformed itself from its traditional functions as the "State’s 
landlord" to include the promotion o f development as part o f its contribution to 
Government’s socio-economic objectives.
Its core functions have been redefined to promote efficient delivery o f services to 
Government and society as a whole.
The National Public Works Programme incorporated as a core function, has a 
section that develops policy, helps transform the construction sector and works with the 
Community-based Public Works Programme. Project management has become a core 
function and most o f the traditional construction work is outsourced to the private 
sector. In 1997, coordination o f government infrastructure delivery previously an area 
o f critical weakness, was made a Public Works responsibility. The strategic role o f the 
Department into the next century is outlined in a 1997 White Paper. A Green Paper 
develops a strategy to promote stability in the construction industry, foster growth and 
international competitiveness, while generating new capacity and addressing 
imbalances.
The explicit need to create employment opportunities was not mentioned.
3.4 Interim Results of the CBPWP
Provincial Department of the Public Works Department
The R150 million was shared amongst the nine provinces according to four criteria: 
level of unemployment, level of poverty, the need for skills, and the need for infrastructure. 
The poorest three (Kwazulu-Natal; Eastern Cape and Northern Province) received 65% of 
the funding.
Assessment^' of the R150 million allocated to the Provincial Departments of the PWD 
revealed the following:
• The bulk of the funding was spent on ‘shelf projects, i.e. previously identified projects 
which had already been designed and specified. These projects had not been conceived 
from an employment generation perspective. Therefore there was an incompatibility 
between the criteria for the CBPWP and realisation of potential during implementation
particularly with regard to choice of project, labour-intensity, and a high degree of 
community involvement.
Similarly, given the demand for rapid delivery little coherent training, technical 
development and capacity building was carried out in relation to the objectives.
There were wide disparities in wage rates and conditions of employment exacerbated 
by official NPWP documentation stating: "labour standards will be as closely aligned 
with those in the formal sector as possible" (NPWP 1995b:7).
In the NPWP documentation it was envisaged that "in order for lessons to be learnt and 
for the programme to improve with time, it is essential that mechanisms for monitoring 
and evaluation are put in place" (NPWP, 1995b: 13). Again due to the pressure of 
rapid delivery, monitoring and evaluation systems were not established prior to 
implementation. Subsequent evaluations have revealed that appropriate data needs to 
be identified, then recorded and reported.
As for the NPWP as a whole, there were institutional difficulties within the PWD and 
its Provincial Departments and between other institutions such as those responsible for 
Water affairs. Transport, Land, Constitutional and Housing.
Lack of understanding of the role of the CBPWP in relation to the NPWP, in particular 
its role as a pilot programme for the NPWP. With respect to the NPWP it was 
envisaged that the "... programme could last over ten years" (NPWP, 1995b:7). 
However, the lifespan of the CBPWP was not spelt out clearly. In its first year it was 
expected to develop the capacity of the provinces to implement development projects. 
By reference to relevant experience elsewhere and reality in South Africa this was not 
a realistic time frame.
Most of these shortcomings were the result of demand for rapid delivery. As seen above in 
the Green and White Papers the Department remains committed to the CBPWP objectives. 
Some important lessons have been learnt which the Department is attempting to incorporate 
into its future programme.
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Non-Governmental Organisations
By contrast to the provinces, alltKation to the NGO’s was not transparent. Certain 
institutions would not usually be seen as community-based. Secondly, the allocation of 
NPWP funding was not made public until R70 million (70% of the NGO funding) had been 
allocated to the Independent Development Trust’s Community Employment Programme 
(IDT:CEP). R12 million was allocated to the Siyakha Sugar Development Programme, R8,9 
million to the Youth Supported Projects and R4 million to the Transkei Community School 
Building Trust*. This section will only discuss the IDT’s CEP.
Assessments of the efficacy of the CEP vary. However, first, as for the Provincial 
CBPWP most of the projects funded were already at advanced stages. The PWD needed 
rapid delivery and this was the main determinant of the projects chosen, not the NPWP 
criteria.
Initial IDT assessments of its own CEP were reasonably bullish. It claimed to have ^  
established local capacity to implement employment creation in projects. Other early 
assessments were more critical: the creation of local institutional capacity has been
challenged; the quality of assets questioned.
It was stated that the PWD wanted to give money to NGOs that were capable of 
running the programme countrywide, i.e. institutions with the capacity and experience 
to manage and distribute funds. The institutions mentioned lacked a national character 
and/or proven experience.
A Quality of Assets investigation was initiated,”  by the NPWP Task Team, in 
response to reports of quality problems, The investigation aimed to:
• study a selection of CEP projects in order to verify the reports of quality problems;
• try to define minimum ‘technical standards’;
• identify causes of quality problems and identify reasons for successes;
• make recommendations for action to limit quality problems in future CBPWP projects. 
The study teams visited 55 projects in 7 (out of 9) provinces during May and June 1995. 
The total value of the projects was R10,5 million (15% of the R70 million total). The 
authors admit that the study had limitations particularly with regard to selection of projects, 
time allocated for investigation, and method of collecting data. Nonetheless the following 
conclusions were reached:
Projects (%) Quality Problems
36 None
24 Minor
31 Significant
9 Serious
In addition 35% had levels of service problems; 25% labour-intensive problems and 7% 
prioritisation problems.
An example of a labour-intensive construction problem was the case where the task rate 
was R15 per 0,4 m  ^excavation in trenches. Workers were achieving eight tasks per day and 
earning R120 per day. This indicates the ignorance of the technical facilitation. It also 
compromises the CBPWP goal of targeting the poor and sets a bad example to government 
departments with regard to cost-effectiveness of labour-intensive methods: ‘Some engineers 
have insufficient knowledge of appropriate technology and labour-intensive construction’.
A similar remark was made about facilitations. In relation to funding constraints, the study 
team concluded that there appeared to be a contradiction between the NPWP’s goal of cost- 
effective production of good quality assets and once-off allocation; good quality, cost- 
effective assets required longer term capacity building of programme manager and 
facilitation, which in turn requires longer term funding. They recommended that the NPWP 
should consider longer term funding commitments to NGO’s rather than once-off allocations 
of funds.
As to the objectives of the CEP and CBPWP, the study team observed that, on some 
projects, the CEP facilitation teams have had problems translating CEP and CBPWP 
objectives into good practice. For example, the objective of community control and 
empowerment had been interpreted on some projects as giving the people what they want, 
even if its is an inappropriate level of service. The study team recommended:
• CEP project funding criteria should be reviewed to ensure that they adequately reflect 
the CBPWP goals of cost-effectiveness of construction methods;
• The CEP and NPWP should hold workshops with facilitations to go through practical 
case studies to illustrate translation of objectives with good practice.
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As mentioned above, the study team remarked upon the limitations of the once-off 
allocations and the short time horizon. It could have made more of the need to link the 
labour-intensive construction of good quality assets with long term programmes. Technical 
sophistication (which includes labour-intensive construction given the equipment based nature 
of the industry) is not compatible with short term fast tracking in the CBPWP context. The 
type of project is of particular importance.
In June 1996 the Labour Commission Report stated:
The Commission would have wished to support a stronger recommendation that the 
scale of the Community-based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) would be 
increased significantly. However, the Commission cannot recommend an increased 
commitment to the CBPWP until credible monitoring and evaluation information from 
the CBPWP convincingly shows that the CBPWP is creating jobs and skills by 
delivering infrastructure through processes that are both community-driven and cost- 
effective,”
By contrast a roughly contemporaneous review by the Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry (CASE),”  South Africa has probably one of the best Public Works Programmes 
anywhere. In terms of technical design standards and the quality of the completed physical 
infrastructure, the CBPWP surpasses anything that the ILO team members had encountered 
in more than 30 developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Not only this, but the 
level of professional integrity among most of the role players in the CBPWP was, in 
international terms, outstanding. Nevertheless, they reported that the CBPWP had had its 
fair share of problems.
Why are there such differences in assessment? Partly, the CASE study paid a great 
deal of attention to community empowerment, whereas the Labour Commission (which had 
invited another ILO team* to contribute to its work) was concerned by the lack of robust data 
regarding employment (the Community Employment Programme could not say how many 
people had been employed).
This team consisted of tenured ILO officials. The CASE study also used short term 
expatriate consultants for ILO/CASE.
The Department’s own assessment of the CBPWP may be found in the Government’s 
1998 Report to the Nation, Unlike the NPWP, which has been ‘incorporated as a core 
function’ into the Department and ‘works with the Community-based Public Works 
Programme’,* the CBPWP merited its own titled sub-section.
Community-based Public Works Programme 
Public Works programmes contribute to poverty alleviation, job creation and 
infrastructure development. The Community-based Public Works Programme, 
targeted mainly at rural communities, was allocated R85 million for poverty relief 
during 1997: This was used mainly in the provinces most affected by poverty, namely 
Kwazulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and the Northern Province.
So far, more than a thousand projects have been funded to provide sanitation, road 
building, water provision, environmental protection, clinics, creches, schools and 
community halls.
The programme, which has created over 140 000 jobs, 19 000 o f them sustainable, 
has been redefined to meet new challenges. ”
* Initially, the CBPWP was a strategic thrust o f the NPWP.
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Specific
One of the strategic thrusts of the NPWP was to change the rules so as to generate 
significantly more employment per unit of expenditure on public infrastructure. The other 
was the CBPWP; community-driven projects using labour-intensive methods were to result 
in good quality, cost-effective assets.
A positive result of the NPWP is that it has been incorporated as a core function into 
the Department of Public Works. This is important from the perspective of the importance 
of policy and the establishment of a framework for future progress. However, the NPWP 
has yet to result in a significant increase in employment generated per unit of expenditure 
within mainstream expenditure on public infrastructure (i.e. where most of public expenditure 
occurs). Has the concentration upon Affirmative (now Targeted) Procurement been justified? 
Not yet.
Differing assessments of the CBPWP have been reported. Unlike the NPWP, it was 
considered worthy of its own titled sub-section in the Government's '98 Report to the Nation; 
and ‘was allocated R85 million for poverty relief during 1997’, The PWD is certainly 
making serious efforts to rectify any problems in the CBPWP. But, from experience 
elsewhere and in South Africa, the author concluded above that a proper employment 
creation programme should not be categorised as ‘relief: quality, cost, time and
sustainability become the victims of such an approach. Furthermore, R85 million represents 
only about 2% of current expenditure on civil engineering and less than 1% of expenditure 
on construction as a whole (civil; building; and materials). Thus, too much concern with 
the minutiae of the CBPWP distracts attention from where major expenditure is taking place.
General
In conclusion there are several general implications for South Africa of labour-intensive 
work throughout Africa (i.e. including South Africa).
Specifically: Rural roads may be constructed and maintained by highly labour-intensive 
means: 5 to 7 times more employment being created per unit of expenditure. It is also 
possible to create a significant increase in employment opportunities per unit of expenditure 
across a wide range of civil construction including most municipal or urban engineering 
services and using contractors. Research at this university indicates that there is a high 
employment potential in the construction of high standard infrastructure. Developments in 
South Africa have shown that good quality, cost-effective and timely construction can be 
achieved for a range of work far greater than low-volume, low-cost rural roads. Equally, 
that contractors could play a role in the execution of the work provided that the preparatory 
work had been done: planning, designs, specifications, contract documentation, tendering 
and training of personnel. But the existing structure of the industry cannot be ignored.
Research revealed that the majority of the so-called labour-intensive work had been 
either conventional or labour-extensive: conventional construction does not produce
additional employment per unit of expenditure; labour-extensive work is the employment of 
a large number of people to produce products of doubtful value without much concern for 
time and cost (these projects reinforce the prejudice of those who cannot conceive of effective 
labour-intensive work).
The national programmes of rural road construction indicate how to establish a national 
employment creation programme for the construction of public works: the process resulting 
not only in greater employment but also in the generation of individual and community
capacities in technical and institutional terms. National programmes have been established 
through:
• the adoption of a long-term national perspective in which a programme is developed;
• attention to technical, institutional, administrative, organisational and socio-economic 
detail during the preparatory lead-in phase and throughout the programme;
• institution building at community, regional and national levels;
• balance between centralisation and decentralisation;
• extensive training at site, multi-site and national levels.
And a corollary: these programmes were not treated as emergency relief.
Although it has a proven track record that does not mean that it will be adopted in 
South Africa. The World Bank has recommended that where no previous experience exists 
a start-up period of at least three years should be considered. But in the present political 
climate even policy makers who are sympathetic towards labour-intensive construction face 
demand for delivery and thus the difficulty of allowing for a lead-in period. Concentration 
on relief or ‘jobs’ detracts even further from the need for a start-up period. There is also 
no doubt that many decision-makers reject employment-intensive methods because they view 
them as ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ and carry the innuendo of ‘slave-labour’. It is still 
recommended that the dilemma be resolved through (i) reviving the concept of a long-term 
employment creation programme and (ii) at the same lime taking advantage of the 
Framework Agreement. 1 remain sceptical regarding the compatibility between employment 
generation in the provision of physical infrastructure if it is done within a relief/emergency 
context. However, there are bound to be relief/emergency/fast track/disaster initiatives. The 
challenge will be to apply the lessons learned from employment creation programmes to 
disaster/relief initiatives: guidelines have been published regarding a sensible approach to
short-term time frames.^* In this way the process of employment-intensive construction 
could indeed make a contribution to alleviating unemployment and generating individual and 
community skills in technical and institutional terms. The four-phased approach outlined 
above is the result of many years of experience and analysis. Adoption of this approach 
would mean that the considerable amounts of money that have been allocated by government 
over the past ten years or so, to so called labour-intensive work would in future have a 
developmental impact as opposed to just providing emergency relief. At least where the 
expenditure of public money is concerned - and in South Africa, 80 per cent of the funding 
for civil engineering is public money - to take the opportunity, provided by construction of 
public works, for people to be part of production.
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